Universal Investment Co. v. Carpets, Inc. : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1964
Universal Investment Co. v. Carpets, Inc. : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mabey, Ronnow & Madsen; Gordon A. Madsen; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant;
Zar E. Hayes; Pugsley, Hayes, Rampton & Watkiss; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Universal Investment Co. v. Carpets Inc., No. 10165 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4636
IN THE SUPREME COURT 










Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County 
Honorable Ray Von Cott, Judge 
ZAR E. HAYES 
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON & WATKISS 
600 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MABEY, RONNOW & MADSEN 
GORDON A MADSEN 
574 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T1\BLE OF CON'rENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE-------------- 3 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COUR'l"' -------------------------------------------------------------··· 4 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------- 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS-----·-··--··--------------------- 4 
ARGUl\IENT 
(A) THE TESTIMONY OF THOMAS 
FRANK REGARDING VALUATION 
AND DAMAGES WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED. -------------------------------------------------- 5 
(B) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DIS-
MISS AT THE CLOSE OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY 
DENIED. ----·-····---··-·-·-----------··-·-----------------------· 8 
(C) THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DI-
RECTED VERDICT MADE AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE TRIAL. -----·······-------------- 9 
(D) THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE 
COURT'S STRIKING THE FINAL 
PARAGRAPH 0 F INSTRUCTION 
NO. 5 TO THE JURY, AND IN ANY 
EYENT THE DEFENDANT CAN-
NOT ASSERT ANY ERROR BECAUSE 
HE FAILED TO OBJECT TO SUCH 
INSTRUCTION GIVEN OR OMITTED 
BY THE COURT. ·······-------··-·------····------------ IO 
(E) THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMIT-
TED BY THE COURT IN REFUSING 
TO RECALL THE JURY IN CON-
NECTION WITH ALLEGED ER-
RORS OF COUNSEL FOR PLAIN-
TIFF IN HIS ARGUMENT. ---···-··-······-··· II 
1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
(F) THE COURT COMMITTED NO ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT ............................................. 12 
(G) THE COURT COMMITTED NO ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL ............................................................... 12 
(H) THE COURT SHOULD ORDER AND 
DIRECT ADDITIONAL REASON-
ABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES, COVER-
ING THIS APPEAL, BE ADDED TO 
THE JUDGMENT BELOW ..................... 14 
CONCLUSION ........................................................ 16 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Statutes 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51 ................ 10 
Cases 
Cirimele v. Shinazy (Cal.) 285 P. 2d 311 ................ 15 
Dankert vs. Lamb Finance Company, 304 P. 2d, 
199 (Cal.) ...................................................... 14, 15 
Hahn vs. Hahn (Cal.) 226 P. 2d 519 ...................... 15 
Johnson vs. Union Pacific, 35 Utah 285, 
100 P. 390 .............. ~ ......... ; ................................... 12 
Kirk vs. Culley, 261 P. 994 .................................... 15, 16 
McCall vs. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 
274 P. 2d 962 ..................................... ·." ................. 10 
Uptown Appliance & Radio Company vs. Flint, 
249 P. 2d 862 ........................................................ 14 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
l'"NIVERSAL INVESTMENT )'. 
COl\IPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent_, 
vs. 10165 I Case No. CAll-PETS, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The Appellant's state1nent of the kind .of _case is 
essentially accurate, except that in addition to the ex-
press warranty set forth in the contract documents the 
plaintiff further relied upon implied ·warranties as -to 
the fiitness for the purpose for which the drapes in 
question were intended. 
3 
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DISPOSITION BEFORE A TRIAL COURT 
The matter was tried to a jury on April15 through 
17, 1964, and a verdict was returned by the jury in 
favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $3,750.00 to which 
the Court added an attorneys fee of $751.83 as had 
been agreed to by defendant at the time of pretrial (R. 
12}. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Respondent ask that the verdict and 
judgment below be affirmed and that this court order 
other and further attorneys fees to plaintiff to cover 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts, so far as it goes, 
is essentially correct. As relates to the warranty period 
in issue, however, attention is called to the fact that 
the guarantee, as originally given, was for a period of 
five years (Exhibit 1-letter attached) and the pretrial 
order was to the effect that Exhibit 2 did not change 
this guarantee period (R. 12-13}. Nevertheless, the 
trial court held, and instructed, that the warranty period 
was to and including September 16, 1963. The draperies 
in question were originally, as the contract required, 
white ( Exhibit 1) . They had changed to variegated 
darker colors, spotted and streaked with different colors 
4 
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and shades ( R. 100) and cleaning made no difference 
in them (R. 97}. As relates to the draperies in Unit 
117, which first became discolored, appellant's state-
ment that the testimony was that iodine or other stain 
had been placed on them is erroneous, the testimony, in 
fact, simply being that Mr. Thompson, defendant's 
agent, had contended that such was the reason for dis-
coloration ( R. 94 and Exhibit 6) . The testimony of 
all witnesses at the trial showed that such conjecture 
was erroneous, as essentially all of the other drapes 
subsequently changed color in the same manner. 
The testimony of plaintiff's witnesses was all to 
the effect that in the industry a change in color during 
a warranty period is considered to be a defect (R. 138, 
168}. 
ARGUMENT 
(A) THE TESTIMONY OF THOMAS 
FRANK REGARDING VALUATION AND 
DiliAGES 'VAS PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
Plaintiff's witness, Ronald Sweitzer, testified with 
regard to the fact that the drapes in question became 
streaked and spotty and were continuing to change 
during the time he was the manager. He stated that 
cleaning had no effect on the changed condition of the 
drapes (R. 97}. Mr. Sweitzer testified that as of the 
latter part of June, 1963 approximately 50% of the 
drapes were real bad and the others were changing 
5-
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color in the same manner ( R. 99) . Mr. Sweitzer testi-
fied that he left the Susan Kay Arms Apartments as 
manager on August 1, 1963 (R. 90) and that at that 
time 99o/o of the drapes had deteriorated and changed 
color (R. 100 and 101), he stating that all except 
about one-half dozen single drapes had changed color 
(R. 106). 
,As a basis and foundation and in connection with 
the introduction of Exhibits 8, 9 and 10, which were 
the sample curtains, and to show that these samples 
were representative of curtains in the apartment at 
the time Sweitzer left, when essentially all of them 
had changed color, we call attention to Mr. Sweitzer's 
testimony as follows (R 106). 
"Q. Now, Mr. Sweitzer, you testified that by 
the time you left there the curtains in all of the 
apartments, with the exception of half a dozen 
single ones, had changed color? 
A. I did, yes. 
Q. What would you say in regard to the situ-
ation as to whether or not the samples which you 
furnished here are representative generally of 
all of the curtains? 
A. I would say that the two drapes that are 
discolored are representative of all of the rest 
of the drapes that are in the apartments." 
It will be observed that this was considerably prior 
to September 16, 1963, which date the Court instructed 
was the end of the warranty period. Furthermore, and 
6 
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as confh-mation of such testimony by Mr. Sweitzer, 
plaintiff's witness, Thomas J. Denkers, testified that 
when he became manager on January 1, 1964 essen-
tially all of the drapes in the Susan Kay Arms were 
discolored and badly streaked ( R 129) . Accordingly, 
there was ample evidence that essentially all of the 
drapes had failed within the warranty period. 
We submit that the testitnony above set forth speci-
fically identified Exhibits 8, 9 and 10 as being essen· 
tially in the same condition as were the drapes generally 
in the apartments prior to the end of the warranty 
period. Accordingly, a proper foundation was certainly 
laid for the testimony of Mr. Frank. Furthermore, it 
should be borne in mind ( 1) that Mr. Frank's testimony 
as to value was not tied expressly or exclusively into 
Exhibits 8 ,9 and 10, except as to the type of material 
therein (R 169), and ( 2) that he was testifying as an 
expert. 
Mr. Frank is an interior designer and specifier, 
dealing in merchandise of the type involved in this 
action and obviously eminently qualified to testify as 
an expert with regard to such matters (R 163, 164). 
He testified that in the interior decorating industry 
and in the industry involving furnishing and sales of 
draperies that if the material changes color at any time 
·within a warranty period it would be considered a de-
fect (R 168). Frank was a qualified expert witness 
and could testify as to values even on the basis of a 
hypothetical question, which, in fact, he did (R 169-
7 
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172). His testimony related to the difference in value 
of drapes of the type. involved if free from defects as 
against their value with the defects which caused them 
to change color during the warranty period. As regards 
such values and damages, he said that such drapes, 
without such defects, were worth approximately $7,-
200.00, but with defects which caused them to change 
color during the warranty period, their value was 15% 
to ·20lfo of what it would otherwise ·be, or reduced to 
dollars, $1,400.00 to $1,500.00 (R 171-172). 
We submit that there was ample and proper basis 
and foundation for the testimony of Mr. Frank as to 
valuation and otherwise, and that his and the other 
evidence amply supported the jury's verdict. 
(B) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DIS-
MISS AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S EVI-
DENCE WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
In addition to the testimony referred to hereinabove 
in connection with sub-heading A of this Argument, 
Mr. Gordon Harry, obviously the best qualified man 
who testified at the trial as relates to the color changes 
and the reasons therefor (R 132-135) testified that a 
change of color is in the industry considered a defect 
which would come within a warranty against "latent 
defects, faulty material," etc. (R 138). . He further 
testified that his examination and testing of the ma-
terials, confirmed by a laboratory report, showed that 
the material had :fluorescent dyes in it and by that alone 
8 
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it would be considered in the industry as "unservice~ 
able" (R 14~), he stating there is no way of removing 
discoloration from fluorescent dyes (R 188). 
Accordingly, there was an abundance of testimony 
from the witnesses for the plaintiff to establish, most 
conclusively, 
(1) That the warranty as against latent defects 
and faulty material, etc., did include a warranty that 
the color would not change; 
(2) That the drapes were in fact defective, and 
such defects appeared during the warranty period; 
( 3) 'That the defect was one which could not be 
cured; and 
( 4) The extent of plaintiff's damages. 
(C) THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR. A DIRECTED 
VERDICT MADE AT THE CLOSE OF THE 
TRIAL. 
Essentailly, the only basis for Appellant's con-
tion that a motion for a directed verdict should have 
been granted, absent the granting of a motion to dis-
miss at the end of plaintiff's evidence, is based upon 
testimony of Mr. Claude Thompson, Mr. Hughes and 
~Ir. Holt, who were witnesses called by the defendant. 
The most that could be said. with regard to any of such 
testimony was that it contradicted testimony of "the 
plaintiff-'s witnesses so that the jury was required to 
9 
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weigh the testimony of the various witnesses and de-
termine which witnesses they would believe and the 
weight which they would give to the testimony of the 
various witnesses based upon their app,arent experi-
ence, qualifications, candor and demeanor on the wit-
ness stand. Such being the case, there ·being substantial 
evidence to support the plaintiff's contention as set 
forth in Arguments A and B above, the jury was en-
titled to consider the evidence, and having done so to 
return a verdict thereon. 
(D) THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE 
COURT'S STRIKING THE FINAL PARA-
GRAPH OF INSTRUCTION NO. 5 TO THE 
JURY, AND IN ANY EVENT THE DEFEND-
ANT CANNOT ASSERT ANY ERROR BE-
CAUSE HE FAILED TO OBJECT TO SUCH 
INSTRUCTION GIVEN OR OMITTED BY 
THE COURT. 
Counsel for the Appellant and Defendant was, 
of course, in the courtroom during all the time the Court 
was reading the instructions to the jury. Defendant's 
counsel took no objections or exceptions to Instruction 
No. 5 nor to any instructions whatsoever, either as to 
those given or those omitted by the Court (R 270). 
Such being the case, defendant may not now assign as 
error the Court's instruction as actually given. See 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See, also, 
McCall vs. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P. 2d 962. 
10 
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In any event, we submit that the instruction as 
given by the Court did in fact properly state the law. 
(E) THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMIT-
TED BY THE COURT IN REFUSING TO 
RECALL THE JURY IN CONNECTION 
\VITI-I ALLEGED ERRORS OF COUNSEL 
FOR PLAINTIFF IN HIS ARGUMENT. 
There is, of course, nothing in the record with 
regard to the argument of counsel and plaintiff em-· 
phatically denies there was anything improper therein. 
Defendant did not, during or at the time of the argu-
ment, make any objection thereto and it was only after 
the jury had been out for some time that he com-
plained with regard to it. The only thing in the record 
which would indicate what the defendant complained 
of was his reference to the fact that plaintiff's counsel 
in his closing argwnent called attention to language 
in Exhibit 2. (R 270). This was an exhibit admitted 
in evidence by the Court in its entirety and without 
reservations or without objection by the defendant 
(R 70). 
If in fact there was anything at all bordering upon 
an improper argument, which we. emphatically deny, 
the defendant waived any right to except thereto by 
failing to take such exception at the time the state-
ments were made and during the argument rather than 
to wait until the jury had been out for some time before 
calling the matter to the attention of the Court. john-
11 
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son vs. Union Pacific, 35 Utah 285, 100 P. 390. We 
submit there was no prejudicial error in connection 
with this matter. 
(F) THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT JUDGMENT NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
The argument as relates to the other points in-
volved fully cover this assignment and we submit that 
no error was committed. 
(G) THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The whole basis for plaintiff's argument that a 
new trial should be granted is that subsequent to the 
trial, through an examination of the fabrics involved, 
appellant and defendant found a thread which they 
feel would have thrown some additional light on the 
matter if it had been previously discovered and called 
to the attention of the jury. We call the attention of 
the Court to the fact that the Exhibits 8, 9 and 10 (in 
connection with which this thread is supposed to have 
been found) were tendered to and available to the 
defendant and appellant for examination, for testing, 
or whatever else they desired to do, at least from the 
date of the pretrial, which was on February 24, 1964 
(R 258). The trial of the case was not held until April 
15, 1964. Appellant cannot surely claim any surprise 
in the nature of newly discovered evidence, which appel-
12 
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lant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered 
had it chosen to take these exhibits and drapes and 
examine the1n when they were available to defendant 
prior to the tin1e ofthe trial, and in fact during the 
progress of the trial. Defendant chose simply to ignore 
these draperies. Defendant cannot surely be heard to 
say that since it did not diligently prepare for the trial 
and since it was unsuccessful in the trial below by 
reason of lack of such diligence, it ought now have 
another opportunity to present the evidence which it 
should have developed and presented at that trial. This 
in a nutshell is the contention of the defendant in urg-
ing that a new trial should be granted on the ground 
of this so-called newly discovered evidence. 
Furthermore, the only thing which appellant sug-
gests is that had the matter been discovered at or prior 
to the trial it would have been something which would 
have made some other or further conflict in the evi-
dence. It would, in other words, have been merely 
cumulative of defendant's other testimony. There is 
nothing in fact to show that such evidence could reason-
ably be expected to have changed the results of this 
trial or the opinion and conclusions of the jury. 
Furthermore, the uniform rule of law seems to be 
that in connection with a motion for a new trial the 
question as to whether the newly discovered evidence 
if presented at the retrial of the case would prob-
ably produce a different result is a question addressed 
to the sole discretion of the trial judge, whose action 
13 
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will not be disturbed in the absence ,of- a .manifest :show-
ing of abuse of .discretion . . Dankent vs. Lamb FiMnce 
Company, 304 P. 2d 199. The rule was recently re-
enunciated in Utah in Uptown Appliance & Radio 
Company .v-s. -Flint., 249 P. 2d 826, wllerein the Court 
stated: 
"It is axiomatic in this State that the decision 
of the triaJ judge in reference to the granting 
or refusing of motions for new trials is a dis-
cretionary matter, provided there is not an abuse 
of discretion and there is reason to "believe that 
a miscarriage of justice would result if -refused:" 
(H) THE .C.OURT SHOULD ORDER AND 
DIRECT ADDITIONAL REASONABLE AT-
TORNEY'S FEES, COVERING THIS AP-
PEAL; BE ADDED TO THE JUDGMENT BE-
LOW. 
The written agreement between the parties .hereto, 
which agreement was the one containing the warranties 
sued upon, provided for payment of . attorney.s fees by 
a defaulting party in the enforcement of -such agree-
ment (Exhibits 1 and 2). The Court below directed 
the inclusion in the judgment of attorneys f_ees in the 
amount of $751.83 in accordance with defendant's 
agreement at the pretrial (R 12). Obviously, such at-
torneys fees did not include, nor contemplate, attorneys 
fees reasonably expended by plaintiff and chargeable 
against the -defendant in connection with an appeal to 
this Court and such ought be awarded and added to 
the judgment below. 
14 
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In Hahn vs. Hahn (Cal.) 226 P. 2d 519, a suit 
was brought on a promissory note. The lower court 
awarded $836.00 as attorneys fees. Plaintiff contended 
he was entitled to additional attorneys fees in connec-
tion with an appeal taken frotn the judgment below. 
The Appellate Court found $300.00 to be a reasonable 
fee and said: "The purpose of a provision for attorneys 
fees is to indemnify the creditor against the necessity 
of paying an attorneys fee, and to enable him to recover 
the full amount of his debt without deduction for legal· 
expenses". 
Again in Cirimele vs. Shinazy (Cal.) 285 P. 2d 
311, the Court, in awarding additional attorneys fees 
for services in the appellate court, stated: "Under the 
rule of Kirk vs. Culley~ 261 P. 994, we may find the 
reasonable value of such attorneys fees without re-
manding the cause to the trial court." · 
Again in Dankert vs. Lamb Finance Company~ 
304 P. 2d, 199 (Cal.), the Court stated: "A contract 
for a reasonable attorneys fee in enforcing its provi-
sions embraces an allowance for legal services rendered 
upon appeal as well as during the trial". 
We submit that this Court has the jurisdiction and 
power, in its discretion, to appraise the legal services 
shown by the record to have been rendered in connec-
tion with this appeal and having adjudicated the value 
of such services to direct the addition of the fair value 
thereof to the judgment entered in the court below. 
15 
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See in addition to the above cited cases, Kirk vs. Culley, 
261 P. 994 (Cal. 1927). 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully suggests that no basis 
w~atsoever has been shown for appellant's contention 
that the Court below committed error and respondent 
respectfully urges that the judgment below be affirmed, 
with the request, however, that this Court determine 
and assess further and additional attorneys fees to be 
added to said judgment to compensate the plaintiff 
in connection with this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ZARE. HAYES 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON 
&WATKISS 
600 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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